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Hungary I Poland I Romania 1 Empowering local selfgovernment Cooperation between advocacy groups and local governments in Hungary, Poland and Romania

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 2 Summary 3 Horizontal study 5 Introduction 5 Background of the study 5 Methodology 5 Local governance under pressure 6 Same questions, different contexts 6 The regime change period: speaking truth to power 7 The turn of the millennium: partnership or cooptation? 8 New localism: finding alternative for cooperation 9 Reclaiming the civic space 10 Making representative claims 10 Representation as a tool: from participation to deliberation 10 Enhancing local civic ecosystems 11 Conclusions and recommendations 12 Hungary 14 Country chapter 15 Case study 1: Budapest: promoting a participative turn in governance through urban interventions 20 Case study 2: C8 – civil society actors in politics: role models faced with a role dilemma 23 Case study 3: “From the street to housing” in Kőbánya: an unlikely collaboration 26 Case study 4: Pécs: developing a social program for the city 29 Poland 30 Country chapter 31 Case study 1: Working for local government – promoting change from within 39 Case study 2: Providing expert knowledge from outside local government 42 Case study 3: Influencing local government as a watchdog – exerting change, putting on pressure 46 Case study 4: NGOs as opposition in the city council – from pushing from the outside to gaining influence as politicians 50 Romania 53 Country chapter 54 Case study 1: City Managers in Romania – Promoters of Change 59 Case study 2: Community Foundations in Romania 63 Case study 3: Participatory budgeting – from proposals to community building 68 Case study 4: Bucharest – Opportunities and Closed Doors 73

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3 Summary Introduction to Research This research is the result of a collaboration between three partner organizations sharing an interest in intersectoral collaborations that strengthen accountability and citizen participation in Central and Eastern Europe. ePaństwo Foundation (Poland), Funky Citizens (Romania) and K-Monitor (Hungary) conducted research in their respective countries to explore the experiences and difficulties that advocacy organizations and informal initiatives face when seeking collaboration with local authorities. We aimed to look beyond the institutional understanding of formally established partnerships or alliances and concentrated instead on the self-determining interactions between activists and decision-makers involved in local cooperation. Therefore, we selected cases that cover both compromise and conflict as equally relevant strategies for the parties involved, and disregarded out-contracted public services, one-time collaborations or externally determined contractual frameworks. The research report consists of one horizontal chapter that generalizes the findings and three country chapters with four case studies each. Between May and July 2020, we conducted 64 semi-structured indepth interviews with representatives from 35 organizations in 35 different local entities, involving both activists and local government officials. Our main ambition was to learn about the narratives used by our informants to describe their efforts to transcend the difficulties of their local political contexts, especially regarding conflict-of-interest situations and their dilemmas about the roles they play and the political claims they make. This is particularly relevant in present-day Central and Eastern Europe, where the widely shared perception of democratic backsliding and the closing civic space in national-level politics have triggered a change in the attitude and the toolkit of local civil society. Seeking collaboration with local partners amidst political tensions is about rediscovering the power of acting in concert and institutionalizing distrust to enable trust. Establishing a collaborative democratic scene away from party politics has the potential to transform both its participants and the community at large. As a result of globalization on the one hand and centralization on the other, local governments have become more and more overloaded by social and economic tensions. It cannot be denied that in most contexts, this has resulted in the suppression rather than the flourishing of local democracy. Still, by looking at the strategies with which local civic actors approach such (often unlikely) collaborations with local authorities, we can learn a lot about the power of civility to prevent isolation and political antagonism, to stand up against the systemic restraints to democratic dialog and to contribute to empowered local self-government. While the professionalization of these interactions has strengthened the institutional capacities of local civil society actors, it has also brought them under tighter regulation and control. Partnerships around broadly consensual policy goals have become the conventional form of the state-civil society relationship, thereby facilitating the outsourcing of public tasks and the provision of public services to civil society organizations. By means of such quasi-private, often informal contracts, civil society and local governments share their resources as formally equal parties to achieve common goals. But such partnerships, promulgated by developmental programs, are increasingly being perceived as a form of political co-optation, whereby social actors have no power and publicity to make claims about the democratic legitimacy and the justification of the political process. The apolitical nature of this type of cooperation has pushed many civic initiatives toward non-risky activities, instead of targeting systemic shortcomings. Less established stakeholder relationships were widely regarded as ill-equipped for cooperation and have therefore been ignored. In our interviews, this partnership rhetoric served as a negative point of reference in relation to which the informants criticized the democratic shortcomings of their local contexts. Since the 2010s, many activist groups have tried to strategically move away from excessive reliance on local government partnerships and towards building local embeddedness to make their operations more independent from partnership contracts. This trend is closely linked to a renewed interest in local issues and urban activism and the use of civic techniques such as citizen journalism, community organizing, public information requests and other kinds of watchdog activities all around the region. This new localism has also triggered a more open approach on the part of local authorities to legitimize themselves via fashionable digital tools and more opportunities for consultation and public participation. Contrary to the one-sided emphasis on the financial terms in CSO-municipal partnerships, our analysis documents a growing interest in the democratic role of local collaborations in improving local civic ecosystems. Activists exert influence on local politics by the interconnected practices of participation, representation and deliberation. Participation as a realm brought about through civil society, and the neutral and self-evident realm of representation through the electoral process, are often described as mutually exclusive logics. By contrast, we have found that the processes of creating new ways of citizen participation and emphasizing the lack of democratic values in political representation interpenetrate each other. By making political claims while tackling concrete local problems, activists can meaningfully connect abstract principles to the deficient social and political conditions of their local context. This process of making representative claims is of crucial importance, since it enables local actors to elaborate on local policies beyond appealing to the goodwill of politicians. Committed to the common good, civic society organizations and local authorities thus work to co-create hybrid institutions

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4 that empower local community efforts. While this changes the modus operandi of local governments from “command and control” to “facilitate and support,” it also means that local actors become interdependent. As one of our Polish interviewees noted, if there is no local government, there won’t be any cooperation at all. In Hungary, the spread of civil society during the 1990s was followed by an imperfect institutionalization of local collaborative practices where CSOs were brought under economic and political control. The discourse on partnership was largely steered by the ‘Westernization’ of civil society as Hungary gained EU membership. Bureaucratic management and project-based funding, leaving little room to question the status quo, often overshadowed civic strategies during the 2000s. After the zenith of the partnership model, Hungarian civil society needed to modify its tactics, also due to the political changes in 2010. The Orbán government has exerted power over the sector through recentralization, creating an ever more shrinking civic space. CSOs reacted to the hostile environment by nurturing new alliances and better local embeddedness, thus becoming relevant players in local politics. After the 2019 municipal elections, victorious opposition politicians promised a better inclusion of civil society in decision-making processes. However, systemic change does not come all at once. Activists are now struggling to change the local authorities’ fixed technocratic attitude and lack of a culture of collaboration, which undermines the commitment of the newly elected leaders. The Polish part of the report tries to identify the most important challenges and preconditions for the implementation of successful cooperation. The chapter focuses on CSOs that support transparency, promote open data, and enhance social participation. The case studies describe four possible patterns of collaboration between local governments and NGOs. First, NGOs can decide to work for the municipality and collaborate with it from the inside. Secondly, NGOs can act as the political opposition and try to collaborate with the local government as political actors. Thirdly, established organizations can decide to move their activities elsewhere after several failed attempts at collaboration with the local government. And finally, CSOs can influence and exert pressure on local governments as watchdogs and whistleblowers. In Romania, the modernization pressure on local authorities was particularly high, which is why internal reforms in progressive municipalities have become the main driver shaping the forms of collaboration with civic society. The idea and the slogan of participatory governance have gained ground in recent years. While this may bring positive results in terms of efficiency (see the case study about city managers in Romania), it often does not harbor any true democratic potential. Participatory mechanisms that are initiated from the top down face serious difficulties in mobilizing and empowering local civil society. Yet local administrations often seek such partnerships with social actors, while local initiatives tend to lack the proper narratives and necessary resources to make claims vis-à-vis local decisionmaking bodies that are overly technocratic, bureaucratic, or simply too distant and detached from the people on the ground. CSOs in Romania thus tend to invest their efforts elsewhere, and they have been especially visible during critical events in national politics that resulted in large-scale public demonstrations. The study is edited and published by K-Monitor (Hungary) in partnership with the ePaństwo Foundation (Poland) and Funky Citizens (Romania). The publication was supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Endowment of Democracy. September 2020 Authors: Luca Sára Bródy, Miklós M. Merényi (Hungary) Justyna Kościńska, Wojciech Sańko (Poland) Alis Socea, Laura Burtan (Romania) Miklós M. Merényi (Horizontal study) Edited by: Miklós M. Merényi Publisher: K-Monitor Public Benefit Association Bajza utca 23. Budapest 1062, Hungary www.k-monitor.hu [email protected] Published under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license. ISBN 978-615-01-0248-1 September 2020

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 5 Horizontal study Introduction Background of the study The relationship between local governments and civic organizations has always been a dynamic one, and it has witnessed several challenges in recent years. This is particularly true for local organizations and informal initiatives that seeking collaboration with the authorities, but at the same time adopt a confrontational strategy in their advocacy and interest representation activities. The present study provides an overview of cooperation between civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in significant advocacy activities on the one hand and local governments in the Central East European region on the other. This report has been prepared by three partner organizations, one from each of the three countries, that share an interest in NGO-municipal collaborations, anti-corruption and community participation. K-Monitor (Hungary), ePanstwo Foundation (Poland) and Funky Citizens (Romania) conducted research in their respective countries and explored the experiences and difficulties of local partnerships. It is based on 64 interviews with representatives from 35 organizations in 35 different local entities (cities, towns or districts). The aim of the research is to support bottom-up democratic reform by sharing experiences of self-organizing communities, to ensure oversight of local governance and to increase the capacity for developing democratic processes at the local level through collaborative practices of reform. The study was ultimately driven by the aim of fostering experiments in NGO-municipal cooperation, and of providing valuable insights into existing processes of trial and error in public participation, advocacy and civic technology innovation. Based on the results of this study, the CSOs involved will prepare recommendations and advocacy guidelines for local actors. To support bottom-up democratic reform, self-organizing communities must be strengthened – not only to ensure civil society oversight of political forces and to anchor democratic practices at the local level, but also to improve the quality of local governance, contribute to the emergence of the next generation of activists and politicians, and broaden this primary entry point for political participation and representation. Methodology Rooted in our shared vision of a democratic future, where civic advocacy is an explicit component of the political process, we jointly elaborated a definition of cooperation between local government and civil society. Our goal was to map the most innovative cases of civic-municipal cooperation, with terms and conditions reflect the autonomous interaction of the parties involved, a process in which consensus and conflict are in dynamic tension. Therefore, we decided to narrow the scope of analysis to the topics of transparency, anti-corruption, citizen monitoring of public services, participatory urban planning, participatory budgeting, community involvement programs, civic technology collaboration, and – as a general principle – to any institutionalized, long-standing cooperation between local governments and citizens or NGOs in which actual power is shared with or delegated to social actors in the course of the policy cycle. We were looking for collaborations that are both substantial partnerships and lasting relationships, but we excluded cases of out-contracted public services, one-time collaborations or externally determined frameworks such as EU grants. Based on the above description, the selection of cases took place through an iterative process of exploring existing practices in each country, starting with desk research of the fragmented landscape of such collaboration. We concentrated on settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants, where collaborative relations are more formalized and less dependent on interpersonal relationships. Nevertheless, we also sought to include more peripheral cases that usually receive less media coverage. We used a snowball sampling method to reach out to relevant interviewees, focusing on collaborations that happened in the past five years. Instead of aiming for an all-encompassing overview of the whole spectrum of cases or a macro-level analysis reflecting the experiences of the majority of actors involved in collaborative practices, our aim was to arrive at a more profound understanding of the narratives that our informants use when they confront the recurring problems of local-level politics. The focus on their efforts to transcend the difficulties of their respective contexts helps to foster our understanding of how problems are perceived in these collaborations, especially regarding conflict-ofinterest situations and role dilemmas. Further, the research sought to uncover how interviewees express themselves about topics such as democracy, sustainability, participatory governance, policy making, community building, advocacy or democratic deficits. Thus, instead of conducting research on innovative practitioners, we as researchers – but also as activists – aimed to engage in a dialog with them to test our normative assumptions about citizen participation. After the preliminary desk research to map relevant examples of NGO-municipal collaboration, we followed a qualitative approach using semi-structured in-depth interviews. In order to be able to create guidelines for advocacy campaigns and improve local governance mechanisms, the interviews covered various issues. Overall, three main topics were discussed. First, we addressed general issues such as the history of the organization, the interviewees’ understanding of their field and network, and their motivation to pursue collaborative

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 6 practices. Secondly, we explored the details of collaboration: how it came about, who initiated it, and how the dynamic changed over time. Thirdly, the interviewees were asked about the challenges they face and how they might be overcome. Between May and July 2020, we conducted around 20 interviews in each country (64 in total) with key experts, local government representatives and civil society activists, which have been transcribed for further analysis. Local governance under pressure Same questions, different contexts Local governments and civil society organizations doing advocacy work on local issues are unlikely friends. Having examined dozens of collaborations between them, it would be misleading to place too much emphasis on interpreting interpersonal elements as a form of friendship. Behind the human components of such relationships there are systemic-structural contradictions and risks that originate at the local, national and global level. To provide stable institutional solutions for mitigating and managing external threats, trust needs to be developed and nourished among local players. But it is equally important to channel distrust and civil discontent into an open dialog based on a shared description of reality. Emanating from peculiar social and political circumstances and taking shape between actors marked by very different logics of operation and cultural attitudes, these collaborations often do not presuppose anything like friendship or mutual sympathy. Working in the shared sphere of a local community, encountering each other as unavoidable peers, decision makers and activists are faced with having to harmonize their diverging interests and value orientations in order to create something common that goes beyond their respective domains. Cooperation and conflict are not two opposing modalities that either produce a positive or a negative relationship. Instead, their interplay creates a singular “other scene” that has the potential to transform its participants and the community at large. Democratic backsliding, which has characterized the recent history of post-socialist countries, creates an even more peculiar context for NGO-municipal cooperation at the local level. Although government policies against civil society organizations in Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe have become an inseparable part of the region’s autocratization processes,1 anti-NGO campaigns antagonizing critical initiatives are not directly relevant in local contexts. However, most of our interviewees referenced systemic changes that have led to a closing space for civil society. Financial cuts and arbitrary funding decisions, smear campaigns and dirigiste (top-down) policies leading to political dependency are increasingly making themselves felt at the local level. Civil society organizations thus struggle to expand their activities, to develop new partnerships and to reach a broader audience with their work. Facing centralized and clientelist power structures that demand at least passive political loyalty, civil society is increasingly deprived of the substance of its functional autonomy. State-controlled media, or the municipal media at the local level, does not provide the necessary publicity for civil initiatives. This limits the abilities of CSOs to shape the political agenda, seek recognition for the problems they perceive and influence the decisionmaking process at an early stage. The involvement of non-governmental actors is often determined by the power holders, which creates the illusion of an all-mighty paternalist political monopoly that is using its social constituency to legitimize the status quo. Such measures contributing to a shrinking local civic space are an everyday experience for citizens and activists alike, albeit to varying degrees in different countries. The role of local governments also differs in the three countries.2 The rampant influence of the central government in Hungary, likely to be strengthened by ongoing centralization efforts, shifts power from the local to the national level. In Hungary, local government is fragmented and exists in a state of symbiosis with a narrow, depoliticized segment of civil society that is at constant risk of being coopted by it. In general, cooperation between CSOs and local authorities has declined in recent years, but in certain areas where local governments face serious challenges, innovative collaborations have reemerged. Since the Hungarian authorities at the national level are unresponsive, local governments are seen by many as a counterbalance to the national democratic decline. In Poland, most CSOs receive some funding from municipal governments, encompassing a vast array of programs in different areas, most commonly in sports, education, culture and social services. Informal grassroots organizations and urban movements have emerged as challengers to political incumbents and represent different local networks and policy agendas. In Romania, EU funds are often distributed through local government authorities, which has contributed to a shift toward a technocratic approach to urban governance. However, this has not resulted in a greater significance of local initiatives. Accordingly, local governments are often perceived as the more important actors, shaping the environment for CSOs and dominating the field of civic engagement. According to comprehensive research conducted by the Erste Stiftung, CSOs have a slightly positive opinion on the role of local governments in their operations in Hungary and Poland, comparable to the impact of the media and of corporations. In Romania, CSOs see local governments as equally influential as the national government, but they also have a more neutral stance toward them. 1 https://visegradinsight.eu/closing-spaces-for-civil-society-a-multidimensional-game/ 2 http://www.erstestiftung.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/civil_society_studie_issuu_e1.pdf

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 7 Unlike the large share of civic society that sees funding from local government as a lifeline, the local advocacy groups involved in this research pursue a more independent approach toward local authorities. But unlike highly professional national-level NGOs that are able to secure funding and other non-material resources such as access to the media and partnerships with international networks, these organizations are struggling to find a balance between local embeddedness and functional autonomy and to avoid social and political isolation. If the partnerships with local governments, the media and the business sector break down, the impact of civil society engagement significantly diminishes. To better understand the causes of this situation, we present a brief historical overview before outlining the general patterns observed in the strategic interplays of collaborative local practices in greater detail. Finally, we scrutinize the conditions that either facilitate or hamper cooperation, and their potential role in a participative turn within a given local civic ecosystem. To put this into more practical terms, we also highlight some policy-level factors that our interviewees frequently mentioned as keys to substantive collaboration. Hungary Poland Romania Population (2020) 9.77 million 37.97 million 19.41 million GDP per capita PPP (in U.S. $) (2019) 3 34,046 33,891 27,998 Percentage of internet users (2020) 4 88.9% 78.6% 74.8% 81,000 CSOs, 64,000 of which 117,000 CSOs, 80,000 of which are 62,600 CSOs, 26,000 of which Number of CSOs5 are active active are active Percentage of the population that actively 4.7% 7.3% 3.6% participates in civil society (2015)6 Percentage of the population that agrees that the work of NGOs is important for the 84% 85% 62% functioning of a democratic society (2019) 3,155 municipalities (among 2,477 municipalities (302 urban 103 municipalities, 217 other Number of local governments at town/ them 23 towns with county communes, including 66 cities with cities (for urban areas), and municipality level rights) + the 23 districts of poviat (county) rights, 642 urban- 2,861 communes Budapest (two-tiered system) rural and 1,533 rural communes) (for rural areas) Average population per local government 3,072 (815) 15,322 (7,540) 6,152 (3,110) entity7 (median population8) 54.90% (first round), 48.83% (second Participation in the last local elections 48.58% (2019) 48.4% (2016) round) (2018) Subnational government expenditure 6.3% 13.3% 8.7% (% of GDP) Percentage of the population that tends to have trust in regional or local public 57.1 % 53.2 % 46.08 % authorities (2019)9 The regime change period: speaking truth to power In post-socialist countries, citizens doing advocacy work are often seen, in both a positive and negative sense, as the successors of former dissidents. In his political essay “The Power of the Powerless” written in 1978, the Czech playwright, dissident and later politician Václav Havel depicts how the very nature of communist regimes can make dissidents of ordinary citizens. By “living in truth” in their daily lives, they automatically differentiate themselves from the officially mandated culture prescribed by the state, since power is only effective inasmuch as citizens are willing to submit to it. While the pre-1989 regimes were characterized by a subsumption of society by the state, social dissidence gave birth to a second society, a parallel polis of citizens. Speaking truth to power was a non-violent political tactic, employed by dissidents against the propaganda of oppressive governments. The always unsettling energy of speaking truth to power despite the possible negative consequences was the core of the identity of dissident civil society, confronting institutionalized power in an anti-political fashion. 3 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (October - 2019) 4 https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm 5 Erste report, p. 20-21 6 EUSTAT 2015 7 EUPACK 2016 8 OECD, 2016 9 EUROBAROMETER, 2019

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 8 But after the regime change, this intellectual strategy offered very little guidance for the behavior and strategies of actors participating in civic initiatives in these newborn democracies, except in terms of an undeniable amount of moral capital. This legacy is a heavy burden on the shoulders of critical activists, who are often denounced by their opponents as either shouting from the sidelines of normal democratic politics or as assuming a superior position to high-handedly proclaim what democracy is about. During the decades of heated political debates following the transition period, the emancipatory value resulting from the fact that dissidents remained independent from the state evaporated. Speaking truth to power from a position of splendid isolation outside politics was particularly incompatible with the deeply interconnected sphere of local politics, where it was difficult to say what being “below” or “outside of power” meant, when creating a democratic environment was an undertaking that needed the active involvement of each and every one. The reason for this was that the regime change brought about a local government reform that replaced the Soviet-style system of councils, which had a highly centralized administrative and bureaucratic structure. Civic involvement in this transformation was not the abnegation of the dissident legacy, but rather the preservation of civic values like non-violence, self-organization, civility and plurality into the democratic era, and the invention of proper institutions that would perform these core values. The respective traditions of the Polish Solidarity movement and the Hungarian democratic opposition were particularly influential, while in post-totalitarian Romania, the civic patterns lacked such a tradition and the post-1989 processes and waves of protest thus had more autochthonous results. But in the midst of the economic and social crisis of the 1990s, the dissident legacy either faded away, was instrumentalized by politics or turned to professionalized initiatives that pursued their goals through formal and informal channels. While this first, post-transition phase of post-socialist civil society was impressive in terms of its size and diversity, its influence on policy-making has remained limited due to structural weaknesses. The turn of the millennium: partnership or cooptation? Many interviewees described the 2000s as a period of professionalization. This inevitable development coincided with administrative attempts to bring civil society under tighter regulation and control. The history of functional differentiation between the state and civil society has left its mark on what we call the civic space today. The imperfect autonomy it created went hand in hand with a blurring of the boundaries between the civic and the public spheres, which later impaired the independent voice and critical stance of civil society. This was due to the fact that the key driver in this process was international and state funding that directed CSOs toward “non-risky” activities (sports, leisure, cultural and social services) by outsourcing public tasks and contracting out the provision of services that the state was unable or unwilling to perform. This established a one-sided autonomy, guaranteed by contracts with the local government. Unlike real partnerships, these arrangements created dependency and emphasized the financial terms of the NGO-municipal relationships. These contracts were quasi-private, often informal, with no public claims to broader democratic legitimacy or justification. These collaborations sometimes became hotbeds for cooptation or even acted as legal loopholes to avoid bureaucratic regulations, for example by using associations and GONGOs,10 which led to corrupt practices that further reduced the transparency of fund distribution. For organizations within these privileged arrangements, partnership meant dependency but also safeguards for future operation. This elaboration of NGO-municipal relations rarely happened in the public eye. Public deliberation was substituted by an almost consensual “creed of civil partnership” that was utilized by the political elite. The rhetoric of partnership – steered by European institutions during the accession process as the preeminent form of state-civil relationships – took the rights and responsibilities of civic partners as self-evident. If partnership is understood as a contractual collaboration agreement between formally equal parties, less structured or established stakeholder relationships will inevitably be regarded as unequipped for cooperation. As a result, civic strategies and activities for exerting influence on the decision-making process that differed from these established partnerships were crowded out. Local politics often used forced or fake involvement of actors from civil society to legitimize political aims, while formal institutions rarely served as actual places of democratic dialog. The autonomy of CSOs (or any kind of stakeholder) was acknowledged mostly in terms of their functional role, the effectiveness and appropriateness of the programs they implemented and the services they delivered. This caused fragmentation within local civil spheres, without any institutional mediation. Incorporated actors grew silent about local events, while actors in liminal positions were in constant tension between a value-oriented civic logic on the one hand and functional effectiveness on the other. With rapid globalization and marketization, local governments became conflict containers, overloaded by tensions originating from the upper levels, exacerbated by fiscal crises and further seclusion. The lack of real cooperative opportunities within partnerships for tackling new challenges and the narrowness of the field when it came to articulating democratic demands through deliberate dialog turned local initiatives toward NIMBY activism11 and the avoidance of conflictual positions. In this risk-averse environment, any deviation from the politics of business as usual was hard to justify. Many of our interviewees from civil society described local politics as little kingdoms in the city hall, isolated from their citizens as a result of impenetrable bureaucratic structures (see especially Bucharest, Romania). In the absence of civic traditions and positive social capital, society often organizes itself along mafia-style patron-client systems. At the same time, in milieus exposed to modernization 10 Government-organized non-governmental organizations 11 T  he term NIMBY (an acronym for the phrase “not in my back yard”) characterizes the opposition of residents to proposed developments in their local area.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 9 pressure, new public management techniques and public-private partnerships appeared. Here, the slogan of participatory governance gained ground, often by bringing civic competencies in-house. But just as in “neo-feudal” contexts, where the mayor is the one who knows best, the framework of neo-liberal governance also gives a supreme position to technocratic managers who, in the name of effectiveness and modernization, pursue policy reform that cannot be questioned. While better coordination between the sectors and branches of local administrations may bring positive results (see the case study about city managers in Romania), it does not harbor any true democratic potential. This is due to the fact that the engagement of local stakeholders is hampered by a weak and domesticated civil society. New partnerships initiated by local governments in the 2000s with powerful local actors differed substantially from conventional participation models prescribed by legislation (such as public hearings), but they involved citizens only as a target group, and rarely included disadvantaged groups. Thus, civic activism decoupled from official partnerships reappeared in the 2010s – to some extent as a reaction to the criticism outlined above – as expressions of solidarity and grassroot embeddedness, trying to transcend the distrustful and individualist attitudes, learned helplessness and scapegoating that contributed to the rigid roles of rulers and ruled in local politics. Although different norms and habituses continue to exist in parallel, this new stance toward civic engagement has proved to be more effective in tackling the problem of the weakness of interest articulation and advocacy. Such activists distinguish themselves from old-school civil society organizations, but their attitude is also different from people involved in social movements who tend to institutionalize their activity and strive for broader social change. New civic attitudes resulted in new forms of cooperation between local initiatives and municipalities that are less focused on institutionalized politics and resources but instead aim to act collectively to strengthen the community and build solidarity by exercising local self-government. New localism: finding alternative forms of cooperation Following the crisis-ridden period after 2008, not only a new generation of urban movements and activists appeared on the local scene, but a reappreciation of local issues and commons (from public services to culture and identity) also took place. This new localism brought back into focus the decision-making processes of local governments, by calling decision makers to account through social media, citizen journalism, public information requests and other kinds of watchdog activities. Many local decision makers also realized that it is in their basic interest to empower local politics to make decisions of better quality and greater legitimacy and – in the face of budget cuts and centralization efforts – to strengthen their position in multi-level governance frameworks. Instead of ignoring citizens’ input as disturbing interference, local governments appear more and more open toward public engagement. To some extent, this was also a result of the switch of EU policies from the regional to the urban level. As cities were turning into major targets of investment and catalysts for economic growth, they also needed to find allies for large-scale urban development and new ways of legitimizing urban interventions. Digitalization is another important driver for involving local citizens in determining and controlling the public services they need and consume on a daily basis. Today, cities cannot tackle social problems and economic imperatives without the involvement and participation of non-state actors. But the growth of the audience and of the consumer democracy in bigger cities, mediated through digital tools, often turned into mere political campaigning to manufacture political consent. Top-down participative restructuring proved unsatisfying in almost every context, where the social forces of new localism became vocal and critical either through conscious community-organizing efforts or through the spontaneous eruption of protests. There is a characteristic pattern to the political contexts behind most of the successful collaborations that we examined in our research. It starts with grassroot social mobilization, very often around trivial demands, without any clear political dimension. Ambitions to achieve policy change require a political window of opportunity. This can be a political vacuum or a change in power, where new actors with an organic vision of and personal affiliation with public participation open the floor for change. However, these are preconditions for but not the decisive factors in progressive democratic reforms carried out by NGO-municipal cooperation. Intensifying and restructuring participatory mechanisms in a collaborative manner and ensuring that they are based on the equal terms of a substantive partnership is a long and exhausting process. Despite the best intentions, conflicts and dead-ends are part and parcel of building collaboration. Rapid delivery of positive outcomes often comes at the expense of democratic deliberation, which is only exacerbated by the erratic goodwill of those in power. Intensive cooperation, however, creates its own underpinnings by mobilizing the power of collective intelligence, turning conventional bureaucratic procedures into a discovery process. Public participation is not an end in itself, but a learning process that can help to identify new allies and possibilities by transcending the petrified roles of rulers and ruled. But the real peculiarity of civic-municipal cooperation lies in the fact that in addition to serving as a true creative laboratory for democracy, it also compels participants to create sustainable institutional solutions in line with the behavioral patterns of the community. This discovery process often yields outcomes that can also prevail in contexts other than the original field of cooperation. Public engag ement is inherently tied to the general life of the local community, since a shared interest in public affairs presupposes certain precon ditions of acting together (e.g. the rebuilding of micro-communities, a strong local identity, mutual solidarity). Civil society organizations participating in collaborative practices with local governments are also agents advocating for a stronger and more active community, while the local administration is responsible for demarcating the boundary between local public affairs and particular demands that are beyond the control of the local government. In a social context marked by new localism, digitalization, post-materialism as well as an unbalanced relationship between the state, the market and local societies, these boundaries are constantly being renegotiated. As public participation is becoming fashionable, it is more important than ever to differentiate between real participation that expands the physical

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 10 and discursive spaces where people can meet and practice their citizenship collectively, and bogus participation that opens only a narrow field to public engagement, while keeping it strictly separated from the “core activities” of the public administration. The strategic dilemmas described by our informants can be seen in the light of such contentions, as they strive to effectively activate the democratic potential of participatory and collaborative practices and to find their functional role in local governance. Reclaiming the civic space Making representative claims The relationship between the political and the civil sphere is often described as a dichotomy between participation as a realm brought about through civil society, and government as a realm of representation. Taking a closer look at the cases presented in this study, instead of two mutually exclusive logics we have found that participation and representation interpenetrate each other beyond sectoral boundaries. While local governments play an active role in instituting public participation, civil society organizations are part of the multi-level representative field. Acting as a member of civil society is also participation in the discursive field where claims are made of representation and legitimacy. Seeing the acts of CSOs as representative claims12 thus shifts the attention from civil society as an intermediary realm of interest articulation and aggregation to one of activated citizenship as a creative act, where social constituency is a moving target. The “representative claim” framework developed by Michael Saward sees representation as a dynamic interaction between a wide range of representatives (including CSOs) and those they claim to represent, instead of a static institutional fact resulting from the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians. All kinds of actors, elected and unelected, make claims to represent certain constituencies. Therefore, the role of non-elected actors such as CSOs can be understood as being broader than simply that of audience or spokesperson striving to be represented in the formal political process. Instead, CSOs are actively making claims about themselves as representatives in well-defined cases (e.g. clients or marginalized groups) and have a strong say on the whole representational process by claiming certain practices to be legitimate or illegitimate (e.g. by declaring that the results of an official consultation process are discredited due to a lack of transparency). Through institutional and non-institutional politics beyond elections, civil society can effectively exert influence on local governments by claiming the authority of universal norms “from above” (be it human rights, policy goals about climate change or issues from the agenda of national politics). More importantly, they can combine these norms “from above” with the authority of speaking for people “from below” governments (either by their own embeddedness or by creating alliances). The “sandwich strategy”13 of representative claims that can authentically link “above” and “below” provides an effective symbolic-discursive construction for local CSOs, while the one-sided function of humanitarian representative, acting only as a moral compass that speaks truth to power from above, can easily prove to be deficient in local politics. In the context of rising populism, the explicit articulation of these alternative claims is particularly important, since the field of representation is increasingly emptied out by populists claiming to be the only true representative of the people, while at the same time arguing that citizens are weak and impotent without a strong leader. Representation as a tool: from participation to deliberation While making a representative claim is important, this does not mean that a local CSO has to declare itself to be a replacement for the mayor and the municipal council. CSOs make claims about the aptitude or capacity of a would-be representative and about the relevant characteristics of the social audience, even without a mass political movement or plentiful resources behind them. Political actors at the local level usually have more resources at their disposal, but they are less well-equipped when it comes to the resources that are important for public participation (social capital, volunteers, etc.). In making a claim, a certain degree of tension with the local government is a constant possibility, but instead of an antagonistic stance toward politics, civic organizations are more likely to negotiate their claim and secure recognition for their activity. While local governments can legitimately call into question civic representative claims when they are too vague, they cannot arbitrarily decide on the membership in civil society. Discursive efforts to create functional differentiation between local politics and civil society need to be anchored in public institutions (consultative bodies, funding policies, local regulations, etc.). Colonizing efforts to undermine the inner logic of the other sphere need to be kept at bay. Universal values and the autonomy of civil society should not be swept aside for the sake of efficiency and the concentration of power. Similarly, the formalistic ideals of the state bureaucracy (giving each person equal consideration) and of electoral politics (one person, one vote), which mediate between partial interests in the name of the public good, have to be respected. While the local government has to compensate for the structural inequality of membership in organized civil society, the latter also has a role in overseeing the impartial nature of political processes. This strengthens the legitimacy of decision making and invests critical actors with responsibilities. 12 See Saward, Michael (2006). The Representative Claim. Contemporary Political Theory, 5(3) pp. 297–318. 13 The term was invented by Jonathan Fox, see: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dfce/7e8afa6cd54b8165e45e574f42ef70883d09.pdf

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 11 In the cases we reviewed, civic representative claims differ in terms of the connection between participation and representation and in their political relevance. When a CSO sets up an IT platform where citizens can report problems to their local municipality (see the case study “Járókelő – Hungary”), this activity can be translated into a representative claim about average citizens demanding greater digitalization and a more effective administration – a claim that reaches a larger audience than the actual number of users of the platform. Sometimes, those who are represented are directly involved in advocacy activities as clients (e.g. a marginalized group in the case of the community foundations, or of ULE in Hungary), while a CSO can represent a not-yet-existing group of potential users of a certain facility when it submits a project for funding to the local participatory budgeting process. Mission statements and strategic narratives of CSOs that are interpreted as representative claims always imply normative demands about citizens’ involvement and what the process of representation should look like. This is why top-down technocratic governance techniques often lack democratic potential despite their participatory practices. They leave no room for claim-making about the process of representation or its shortcomings, or the improvement of social factors that make democracy work. Thus representation – often through participatory or electoral schemes – is generated in a seemingly neutral and selfevident fashion, thereby providing information for decision makers “on demand.” As a general rule, however, informal channels for interest representation are available. Yet the lack of publicity makes claim-making ineffective, since informal negotiations only allow for micro-level interventions, for instance by acting as a spokesperson for a particular group of residents. The force field in which civil society actually comes into existence is generated by continuous mutual reactions within the public discourse. With no such dialog around claims and participatory practices, there is less autonomy and independence for CSOs, and more arbitrary power of decision makers to coopt and, by using local media, hand-pick “worthies” as spokespersons. Local governments make constant efforts to formalize the channels of interest mediation by transforming them into quasi-private contracts controlled by bureaucratic rules, which allows them to mechanically aggregate social interests and express inherent identities instead of engaging in the process of competing representative claims. This poses a risk for civic advocacy and compromises its capacity for substantive partnerships. This deficiency can only be addressed through discursive embeddedness in a public debate that has the potential to appeal to the whole community of citizens. To sum up, the key to collaborations that push back against the shrinking civic space lies in three interrelated elements: participation, representation and deliberation. First, CSOs play the functional role of creating ways to offer and facilitate effective participation. Then, they have to make a representative claim by linking this activity to universal values, in order to successfully articulate the transformative nature of their work. Lastly, these claims need to be activated through deliberative discourse by actively calling out the deficiencies of the public sphere. This second level of civic practice involves continuous communicative exchanges between the representatives and the represented, which establishes a new norm and a particular form of local culture within the public sphere. Generally, CSOs do not possess any irreplaceable resources or expert knowledge that would make them a valuable partner for the local authorities. This is why it is necessary to carefully craft a representative claim. In their advocacy efforts, local CSOs not only help citizens to participate actively, but – by putting at work their claims in the public sphere – they experiment with a vast array of democratic practices14 to ground politics in a dynamic and reciprocal relationship of deliberation. This creates a second, systemic layer of political representation beyond appealing to the goodwill of council members and the mayor as representatives. If we see CSOs as contributing not only to the mobilization of social input into decision making, but also to the further development of democracy through representation and deliberation, we get a more complex picture of their functions and perspectives, and of how they become part and parcel of local politics. Enhancing local civic ecosystems Local governance in Central-Eastern Europe is at a crossroads. It will either lose its relevance or evolve into a pocket of democracy that actively invests in civic ecosystems to support a democratic renewal. A participatory version of the former scenario, based on the responsibilization of citizens, who thus take part in austerity decisions and the rolling back of public services out of self-interest, is a worrisome possibility. Low-intensity politics – the maintenance of a facade of self-governance that conceals a coopted civil society – is a lived reality in many communities in our region. Such environments are incapable of accommodating alternative representative claims, and thus often lead to conflict. The political or economic success of a city sometimes also works against inclusive operation, while in contexts where political representation is fragile, and the real decisions are made outside of representative organs, public engagement is less prevalent. At the same time, local governments are under increasing pressure, which gives civil society and local governments a chance to recognize their shared interests in deepening democratic governance. By understanding these systemic effects and the constraints within which municipalities have to operate, civic actors are in a better position to create hooks for committing the local administration and leadership to engage in cooperation, instead of remaining stuck in distrust and hostility. The key to unlock the potential of such collaborations is to create enabling conditions not only for a few privileged actors, but for the whole civic ecosystem. Beyond better responses to social and environmental challenges, the collaborations included in this study have enhanced CSOs’ awareness of the difficult decisions made by the local authorities and, to a greater or lesser extent, created a new setting for public dialog. Mutual understanding between the cooperating parties has enabled a better understanding of policy dilemmas on the part of 14 F or example, by organizing public debates, petition campaigns and consultations, conducting surveys, collecting data, engaging in public information out- reach (newsletters), community visioning, study circles, etc.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 12 citizens and more effective deal-making and brokerage between competing stakeholder interests. Civil society organizations operate at the interface between the state, citizens and the market. Owing to their independent position and their embeddedness in society, they can represent and reconcile the interests of a wide range of actors, including marginalized groups. It is also important to note that local collaborations with civil society play an important role in creating coherence between local and global policy agendas. CSOs advocate for these norms and policies, but they are often also able to mobilize expertise and resources that can supplement the limited capacities of the public sector. Participatory governance schemes that operate exclusively on the basis of local government resources are fragile and prone to dependence. Civic ecosystems need to be empowered not only by autonomous deliberative infrastructures, but also in terms of fundraising and networking. Community foundations play an important role in this respect in many cities of the region (see the case study “Community foundations – Romania”). Conclusions and recommendations Although the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a collaboration meltdown in many of the case we investigated, CSOs provided flexible voluntary services even during this period. This disengagement happened despite the fact that municipalities had to establish strong, transparent and accountable measures to ensure proper funding allocation and regulation almost overnight. This phenomenon draws our attention to the resilience and sustainability of collaborative practices. Civic ecosystems have to identify and enforce baseline requirements for democratic governance, including remedies for the logistical and capacity constraints that contributed to the near shutdown of local governance mechanisms. Coming up with quick responses to unforeseen circumstances by involving and linking up local stakeholders is in everyone’s interest. Ensuring continuity instead of having to start from scratch again and again presupposes permanent links between the civic ecosystem and the local administration, as well as knowledge transfers and organic development between waves of mobilization, even in the face of occasional stagnation and dead-ends. Civic initiatives that reach maturity could serve as incubators for other initiatives that perform more specialized activities in different organizational formats (see the case studies “ULE – Hungary,” “Dąbrowa Górnicza – Poland”). Several instruments are available for strengthening the internal coherence of a local civic ecosystem. Perhaps the most important element is the availability of public information. Local administrations must inform the public, provide regularly updated and accessible information about the policy process and share data to foster evidence-based advocacy and real-time public assessment. Local governments have to develop and adhere to transparent, user-friendly procedures in decision making to encourage civic participation. Strategic planning and policy programs are important tools for synchronizing public demands and political will. There will probably always be decisions that are made before those affected hear about them, leaving them with no option but to accept them, but this should be reduced to a minimum. Our interviewees often cited a lack of responsiveness to social inputs, a systemic lack of communication and a lack of honesty. One of the key elements of local governance that our research identified is the operation of local media. Media coverage is an important resource for advocacy groups, which is often unevenly distributed among the actors while favoring those who are close to the decision makers. While there are good examples of independent editorial work, most often the only possibility for CSOs is to create alternative coverage for their work. For example, whether or not a city grants an organization permission to post on its official social media page is subject to little or no formal regulation, with no possibilities of appeal. In such cases of deliberate exclusion, a coordinated action of various actors is needed. Even the formal institutions of the local civil society, such as CSO roundtables, which have been set up to provide for regular consultation with the local government and to act as a common lobbying platform for the whole civic ecosystem, strive to solve the problem of disproportionate media coverage. Our respondents observed the same problem with regard to the distribution of local government funding, which led to the decision of several organizations not to accept financial or non-monetary support. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the financial aspect is central for many local governments when it comes to partnerships; and to some extent, civic independence is “compromised” anyway whenever a CSO is cooperating with a local government (see the case studies “C8 – Hungary” and “Gorzów Wielkopolski – Poland”). While any modification of the funding schemes is a potential source of conflict, a restructuring of the resources (such as grants, administrative services and other goods or services) is often badly needed to strengthen the civic ecosystem. As a general rule, a clear distinction should be made between project funding and the remuneration for public services, where different solutions compete with each other. Project funding plays an important role in improving civil society. As the diversity of available resources contributes to increased adaptability, a flexible and applicant-friendly grant distribution system should be combined with community organization methods. The funding system must put local outcomes first, rather than the reputations of specific organizations, with an emphasis on projects that strengthen the local civic ecosystem (e.g. to bridge the digital divide, involve marginalized groups, promote volunteering etc.). Local governments can serve this purpose also by other innovative means, such as co-funding local crowdfunding or participatory budgeting initiatives, where projects are implemented through ad-hoc coalitions. Likewise, CSOs can play an active role in organizing different groups to elaborate a proposal. Through involvement in budgetary processes, CSOs can monitor local authorities and public service delivery to create an enabling environment for engaging with citizens.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 13 Finally, there is an urgent need for cooperation between local governments and local civil society to come up with joint advocacy initiatives for higher-level policy change. This is all the more important, since it is often higher-level regulations that make cooperation between the two sides impossible. While the trust of local actors in EU institutions is high, these institutions seem ill-equipped in terms of funding, capacity and tools to respond to the shrinking space for civil society, or to marshal the combined pressure of external and local actors in advocating for shared policy goals. A strong political or financial incentive from the donor community in the form of powerful campaign hooks that the local civil society could use would entail a major policy shift. Several respondents also raised the need to review the calls for proposals and tender procedures open to NGOs. While EU institutions and the embassies of Western countries continue to act as an engine for the promotion of democracy and human rights, it is quite telling that our interviews made no references to EU programs when it came to participation, involvement and partnership. Some respondents even claimed that the local administration is not prepared for the joint application for such project-based grants. In these contexts, the EU should increase support to CSOs to build their capacities for engagement with local authorities and local communities, with a view to promoting joint participation in policy-making. The capacity to foster such collaborations is an important asset when it comes to strengthening the democratic space and reestablishing trust in representative democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 14 Hungary BUDAKALÁSZ EGER BUDAPEST ALSÓNÉMEDI GYÁL PÉCS Sites where interviews were conducted

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 15 Country chapter The changing local government landscape in Hungary: is there a place for civil society? In Hungary, the relationship between local governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) has always been a dynamic and sensitive one. This chapter provides an overview of how this relationship has changed after 30 years of democratization and identifies the main issues and recent trends, notably regarding the promotion of more democratic and transparent mechanisms that carry the potential of larger structural changes. Our conclusions draw on research that involved 21 semi-structured interviews with experts (4), local government employees (7), and CSOs (11) covering several different parts of Hungary, including Alsónémedi, Budakalász, Eger, Gyál, Pécs, and Budapest, the capital, at both metropolitan and district level. The political–economic context of civil society development The inclusion of civil society in decision-making processes has been widely debated since the first multi-party election took place in Hungary in 1990. New regulations were put in place through the 1989 Act on the Right for Associating, which legally acknowledged existing informal practices. Although the number of organizations increased rapidly, the relationship between the public sector and civil society was based on spontaneous collaborations that lacked a strategic vision and scarcely resulted in institutionalized practices. The mid-1990s were a time when local governments extensively created non-profit organizations, as a result of the 1993 amendment to the Civil Code.15 Early attempts to incorporate CSOs – imbued with important symbolic capital during the democratization process – into local decision making mostly failed, due to a lack of professionalization of the CSO sector. During the first Orbán government (1998-2002), the “rural” civil society infrastructure was created, providing financial support schemes through so-called “Non-Profit Service Centers” located in the county seats. In light of the closed decision-making processes, civil society was mainly involved in decisions through representative bodies such as municipal councils, with limited influence on public policies (Földi, 2009). In 2003, the left–liberal government continued to develop the country’s civil society strategy, by targeting the creation of a more autonomous civil society (Brachinger, 2008). The NGO sector started to stabilize after the Law on the National Civil Base Program (NCA) was passed, and national and regional NGOs increased in number. However, they operated under the tight control of the funding authorities, serving as more efficient distributors of targeted welfare and community funding, but in a rather ambiguous way. NGOs became less autonomous as political interests interfered with their tasks, both at the central and the local government level (Szalai, Svensson and Vince, 2017). Political control resulted in blurred lines between the public and civil society sphere, which gave rise to corrupt practices and to even less transparency in the distribution of funds. Developmental programs funded by both local and international donors that focused on training civil society and community leaders contributed to their lopsided professionalization, which was characterized by weak administrative capacities and an absence of independent fundraising efforts. The 2010 elections brought the right-wing populist Fidesz party to power with a two-thirds majority, which prompted the new government to launch a series of radical legislative changes that culminated in the adoption of a new constitution in 2011. The Fidesz government was able to hold on to its two-thirds majority in 2014 and 2018. The independence of civil society became highly politicized during this era, as Fidesz imposed a polarizing political narrative that placed “the nation” in opposition to “foreign agents,” embodied by the left-liberal elite and foreign-funded civic organizations (Gagyi, 2016). The new wave of civil society mobilizations in the 2010s coincided with widening political cleavages: CSOs became heavily involved in party politics, putting in doubt the possibility of a “pure” civil society (Gerő and Kopper, 2013). While the nationalist discourse attacked CSOs through anti-Soros and anti-immigrant propaganda, the NGO scene reacted with concerns over the loss of democratic governance mechanisms, the freedom of the local and national media, or the forced departure of Central European University from Budapest. Following the adoption of the new constitution in 2011, the government enacted considerable changes to the legislation governing civil society initiatives, which constrained citizen mobilization in several ways. In parallel with the ever greater centralization of powers, the government’s illiberal measures facilitated the exclusion of autonomous institutions and divergent voices (Majtényi, Kopper and Susánszky, 2018). Furthermore, the 2011 law16 curtailed the autonomy of CSOs, reduced their funding opportunities and created new regulations that induced greater bureaucratic pressure (see Nagy, 2016). 15 1 993 XCII. Act amending certain provisions of the Civil Code. Due to the change in the nature of the state’s role in fulfilling public tasks, new types of non- profit organizations were established that created a bridge between CSOs based on voluntary initiatives and public institutions fulfilling state duties. Public foundations are a special type of such organizations. 16 2011 CLXXV. Act on the Right of Association, Public Benefit Status and the Operation and Funding of Non-Governmental Organizations

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 16 In addition, local governments have seen their autonomy erode over the past decade, due to a weakening of their capacities and shrinking financial resources. The 2011 amendments to the 1990 Act on Local Governments17 aimed at a re-centralization of finance, healthcare and education and thus put an end to efforts to create a decentralized local government system (Pálné Kovács et al., 2016). Consequently, managing city-level policies has become a much more difficult task, since national-level policies interfere with the management and implementation of collaborations. Besides, the collaborations between local governments and CSOs receive less and less funding from the national budget, which has increased their reliance on EU and foreign funds. On the one hand, local grants and funding schemes are scarce and create a high degree of dependence on the part of local CSOs. On top of that, as István Sebestény, a researcher analyzing NGO-statistics notes, local governments are only aware of roughly one-third of the existing CSOs, which dominate the field of formal collaboration while maintaining a very narrow and apolitical focus. On the other hand, applying for EU funds remains out of reach for most organizations, since they lack the necessary administrative, language and networking capacities and experience to successfully apply for competitive, large-scale funding schemes. 1989 1996 1998 2005 2007 2011 2014-2015 Law on Law on Law on public Law on public Public benefit NCF replaced by state- Government attack freedom 1% support benefit status benefit company replaced by controlled National against foreign- of association for CSOs of NPOs volunteering nonprofit company Cooperation Fund supported CSOs 1987 1994 1996-2008 2004 2006 2011 2011 Legal form of Public benefit Differentiation and Establishment Creation of legal New regulation Tax incentives for foundation company and gradual decrease of National Civil form of social of public direct corporate reestablished public law NPOs of tax advantages Fund (NCF) cooperative (NCF) benefit status donations to sports Key events in the development of Hungarian civil society. Source: Vándor et al., 2017. To sum up, the collaborations between civil society and local governments are strongly influenced by changes in the political-economic context of Hungary: since 2010, opportunities for influencing national-level policies have gradually disappeared for most NGOs.18 Therefore, these organizations have instead focused on local politics and micro projects where it still appears possible to have an impact and carry out advocacy work. Yet, the opportunities for formal collaborations have been curbed both through the reshuffling of local government responsibilities and through tighter regulations of the civil society sector. A balancing act between dependence and shrinking resources To prevent being subsumed into local party politics or becoming too dependent on local governments, CSOs have used several tactics to increase the level of trust and their reputation among citizens. One of the key efforts of CSOs has been to create visibility for their projects, by targeting tangible and short-term results. In doing so, they are able to avoid taking political risks or getting lost in the bureaucratic processes of the local government. To focus mainly on non-party political issues, CSOs use a wide variety of tools. Surveys, door-to-door communication or fostering participation on public issues are important elements when it comes to raising awareness of specific matters. For example, in the 8th district of Budapest, C8 (Case Study 2) followed this strategy in its campaign for the 2019 municipal elections, reaching out to residents in a proactive way. Many respondents point to a second obstacle to their successful operation, namely the biased local media. For example, in Budapest, the municipality does not ensure proper media coverage of collaborations, meaning that it is mainly up to the CSOs themselves to publicize them. The media could play an important role in channeling demands, but Hungary’s media environment is currently very biased in general, with Fidesz receiving much greater coverage throughout the country. Therefore, seeking political alliances among the opposition does not offer the prospect of improved visibility for the organizations. In addition, the political divides do not always help CSOs to make themselves visible, especially if their demands and criticism target both sides, and are not taken up by any political party. Local CSOs compete with each other for publicity, which often results in one powerful actor being handpicked by local politicians as the voice of the CSO sector. The rotating presidency of the Civil Society Roundtable in Eger, which divides media attention among the various CSO actors, is a rare counterexample. 17 2011 CLXXXIX. Act on Local Governments of Hungary 18 E  xcept for certain NGOs that carry out political activities in support of certain policies that are important for the government (also known as GONGOs – gov- ernment-organized non-governmental organizations) or charity organizations that manage outsourced public duties, which are often run by officials who also hold political office in the area of social policy.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 17 What is more, relying on the input of citizens is a rather new phenomenon for CSOs. Promoting a culture of volunteering and recruiting and training new activists and members are key criteria for making their actions more visible (see Case Study 2). This is very difficult due to the fact that most people in the larger cities have full-time jobs, with little free time to deal with public affairs. Consequently, the CSO sector often depends on other resources, such as expert knowledge or national and international networks. However, there is a sign of hope, as Hungary’s culture of donating has gone through a major change in recent years, according to our interviewees, which they tend to attribute to the central government’s adversarial approach to CSOs: this hostile environment pushes them to seek alliances not only with local governments, but with citizens directly. As Cili Lohász, the founder of VaLyo, recalls, “15 years ago, it was impossible to collect this level of donations, and now it is becoming more and more common.” Similarly, Erika Barna, an expert on community foundations highlights that next to corporate social responsibility and charity, local donors play a prominent role in stabilizing the income of organizations. Therefore, embeddedness in the local environment is now an important factor in managing successful fundraising campaigns that target individual donations. The problems of embeddedness Even though the participatory turn has gained ground, especially after the October 2019 municipal elections, an urbanist working in the field notes that he does not “feel that there is a civil society boom at the moment”. Instead, “a lot of the organizations have entered another phase; those that have been around during the last decade, they are becoming more professional, and do important work in the fields for which they have been fighting in for years”. These civil society members are often more progressive than the previous type of CSOs, which during the 2000s had the chance to participate in local partnership models that were partly influenced by EU funds earmarked for various forms of collaborative urban development. To counter the impact of overly bureaucratic processes, the new wave of CSOs since the 2010s has pursued more flexible types of cooperation, for example by turning towards residents rather than local governments. As a CSO founder from Budapest explains, “there was this ’enlightenment’ in the civil sphere around 2015-2016, when the national government started an attack against foreign-funded NGOs.” CSOs realized that without society backing them, it would be impossible for them to achieve their goals, which caused them to try to become more embedded in their local contexts by tackling local issues. As the urbanist expert, who often plays an advisory role in collaborative practices, notes, “the next round would be to strengthen the whole ecosystem. Local governments are not yet good at networking, we try to help in that. The Municipality of Budapest has held meetings with civil society actors, but I’m not sure how far this will go.” In his point of view, there is a will but not yet a way to build the necessary infrastructure for implementing the vision of a collaborative turn. Another issue affecting the dynamics of collaboration is the division of the CSO sector, not in a political sense, but rather in the way the organizations approach collaboration with local governments. The more established CSO actors are usually better embedded in the local governments’ cooperation schemes, as they take over municipal duties by performing welfare services, mostly for disadvantaged groups. Newer, more informal civil society groups often criticize these established organizations, since over time they can easily become coopted by the system, thereby sustaining the status quo instead of highlighting structural problems and using their position to lobby for changes (Case Studies 3 and 4). Such criticism most often targets the lack of transparency of these collaborations, as well as their shortcomings when it comes to empowering vulnerable groups or showing solidarity with other, less embedded CSOs and their demands. Meanwhile, the newer CSOs put much greater efforts into networking, by supporting both bottom-up initiatives and each other, as well as by maintaining a more critical approach towards local governments. This is the case in the city of Pécs, where traditional CSOs have a formalized, financial and secure relationship with the local government, while grassroots organizations do not receive the same kind of attention, although they are often much more present in the everyday lives of disadvantaged citizens. While the Maltese Charity Service has a long history of performing outsourced public duties by providing care and assistance for vulnerable groups, A Város Mindenkié (AVM) Pécs and Emberség Erejével Alapítvány (EEA), which are more critical towards the local government, are largely excluded from the decision-making processes. Debating institutionalization: CSO strategies from conflict to cooperation Even though the aim of the political discourse at the national level is to strengthen the divide among civil society members, the majority of the organizations we interviewed have not developed a clear political vision. As a member of the Civil Society Roundtable from Eger notes, there is a constant focus on civic issues with no particular interest in “big politics.” Instead, CSOs try to overcome the legal, financial and regulatory obstacles that prevent them from achieving their goals. The main challenge in terms of collaboration is the “taming” of critical voices when CSOs become formal partners of the local government. Our respondents agree that working together with local governments often causes them to change their tactics, as they become more careful and on occasion even stop to communicate until the

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 18 local government has framed its own position on the projects in question. The reason for this change in behavior is partly the sensitive nature of formal collaborations, alongside the hope that being more constructive will lead to better results in the end. Ultimately, the goal is to change ineffective processes and negative reflexes. To this end, CSOs choose different paths, either by being confrontational or by trying to find common ground. Depending on the goal and motivation of CSOs, some respondents believe that the only way to exert pressure is to remain critical, by monitoring the everyday practices of public administrations from the outside. As the founder of Civil Kapocs, a watchdog organization, explains, “in the long run, collaboration with local governments cannot be successful, as they don’t have any real interest in finding common ground. The control mechanisms that we provide are working against them.” In order to perform this control function, CSOs have to take a “militant approach” by actively engaging in a conflictive relationship with the local governments: suing them to disclose data or pressuring them to become more transparent by making documents available to the public. Some of the other CSOs meanwhile maintain that besides playing the role of watchdog, they also have to acknowledge the necessity of an occasionally more cooperative relationship with local governments. As the founder of Civil Kalász explains, the goal is to make decisions together, involving as many people as possible. “If we can clearly define our needs, it is easier to shape the approach of others, and this is the practice I am currently missing.” For these organizations, depending on the context and the issue at stake, dialog is more important than confrontation, given that the role of CSOs is to channel citizen demands to the local government by providing constructive suggestions. In other words, they prioritize the creation of communication platforms, where ideas can be shared and developed. Usually, these CSOs are more informal, similarly to the confrontational groups, with a very clear agenda that they intend to push through. They are consistent in their actions for reaching their goals, build public support for their cause, and devote time to raise awareness of the importance of sustaining channels for effective mediation between citizens and local governments. As the example of C8 shows (Case Study 2), such a clear vision includes the idea of self-governance, enabling citizens and elected members of the local government to act as equal partners. While some groups cite the possibility of dialog as their main goal, others focus on collaboration that will produce concrete results. If the goal of CSOs is to change a certain legislation or policy, their strategy is concentrated on more practical aspects: providing alternatives to inadequate public policies and highlighting the need for systemic change (see Case Study 3). In the case of the Kőbánya district in Budapest, the Utcáról Lakásba Egyesület association (ULE) combines local embeddedness (involving affected citizens directly) with public policy goals (a “housing first” approach), by building on a discourse of the right to housing and the associated responsibility of the public sector in providing help to those in need. CSOs offering alternative approaches to existing policies believe that a long-term approach is necessary to find better solutions. To this end, cooperation, autonomy and identifying potential political allies are important elements in order to be able to experiment with alternative scenarios that will eventually achieve the desired structural changes. Finally, several organizations believe that the best strategy is to become involved in local politics to be able to upscale their demands and effect change. As the founder of Civil Kalász explains, “dealing with local causes is always a political act, you cannot avoid engaging in politics.” CSOs that decide to participate in local politics and elections by endorsing politicians or political formations find it difficult to be perceived as independent by the public, since many people view them as an extension of the local government. Nevertheless, they often consider campaigning for an oppositional candidate who shares the same values to be a sound strategy for reaching their goals. The example of C8 in the 8th district of Budapest (Case Study 2) is a case in point: When C8’s candidate won the municipal elections, the organization was torn between members who entered local government and those who remained outside of it. Many vocal residents see C8 as a privileged CSO or a local party, which goes against the activist’s perception of their situation. C8 does not accept subsidies from the municipality and does not even rent any premises from it, but this is hard to explain to the public. Drawing on these two examples, the main difficulty that CSOs face is the need to explain the difference between local and party politics. The goal of these organizations is to emphasize that they do not necessarily want to become decision makers themselves, but instead aim to provide a platform for discussion. In parallel with the differnt approaches of the CSO sector outlined above, local governments are also facing new challenges. The imple mentation of the participatory turn that the opposition promised after the 2019 municipal elections has still not materialized. So far, the Municipality of Budapest has appointed one deputy mayor to be in charge of participatory mechanisms and to facilitate civil society inclusion in decision-making processes (Case Study 1), while other local governments have proposed to follow a similar, more inclusive approach aimed at resolving the conflicts that previously characterized the relationship between CSOs and the public sector (Case Studies 2 and 4). Notwithstanding the outbreak of the pandemic in the spring of 2020, which turned into a major stumbling block for the implementation of these plans, several other obstacles remain: how to define clear roles and responsibilities within municipal govern ments for effecting a real participatory turn, what part civil society should play in mediating between the needs of citizens and local governments, and how to include a wider number of CSOs in this process rather than simply deepening the relationships with existing partners.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 19 References Brachinger, T. (2008) ‘A civil kezdeményezések hatása a városi kormányzásra’, Tér és Társadalom, 22(1), pp. 93–107. Éber, M. Á. (2018) ‘A jéghegy csúcsa. Középosztályi tiltakozások a 2010 utáni Magyarországon globális összefüggésben, a Hallgatói Hálózat példáján’, in Antal, A. (ed.) Mozgalmi társadalom. Budapest: Nolan Libro, pp. 220–242. Földi, Zs. (2009) ‘A társadalmi részvétel szerepe a városfejlesztés gyakorlatában – európai és hazai tapasztalatok’, Tér és Társadalom, 23(3), pp. 27–43. Gagyi, Á. (2016) ‘“Coloniality of power” in East Central Europe: External penetration as internal force in post-socialist Hungarian politics’, Journal of World-Systems Research, 22(2), p. 349. Gerő, M. and Kopper, Á. (2013) ‘Fake and dishonest: Pathologies of differentiation of the civil and the political sphere in Hungary’, Journal of Civil Society, 9(4), pp. 361–374. doi: 10.1080/17448689.2013.844449. Majtényi, B., Kopper, Á. and Susánszky, P. (2018) ‘Constitutional othering, ambiguity and subjective risks of mobilization in Hungary: Examples from the migration crisis’, Democratization, pp. 1–17. Nagy, Á. (2016) ‘A magyar állam civil társadalommal szembeni hét halálos bűne’, in Antal, A. (ed.) A civilek hatalma - A politikai tér visszafoglalása. Budapest: Noran Libro, pp. 146–161. Pálné Kovács, I. et al. (2016) ‘Farewell to Decentralisation: The Hungarian Story and its General Implications’, Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava : časopis za teoriju i praksu javne uprave, 16(4), pp. 789–816. doi: 10.31297/hkju.16.4.4. Szalai, J., Svensson, S. and Vince, D. (2017) Contested forms of solidarity: An overview of civil society organizations in Hungary and their impact on policy and the social economy. Working Paper Series 2017/10. Budapest: CEU, Center for Policy Studies. Available at: http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00007239/ (Accessed: 13 April 2020). Vándor, P. et al. (eds) (2017) Civil society in Central and Eastern Europe: challenges and opportunities. Vienna: ERSTE Stiftung (ERSTE Stiftung studies). Available at: http://www.erstestiftung.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/civil_society_studie_issuu_e1.pdf. List of respondents Case Study 1: Budapest – promoting a participative turn Máté Lukács | Coordinator of Járókelő Ádám Kobrizsa | Founder of Mindspace Cili Lohász | Founder of VaLyo Gábor Kerpel-Fronius & András Szeles | Deputy Mayor of Budapest & the City Hall officer responsible for relations with civil society Case Study 2: C8 – civil society actors in politics: role models faced with a role dilemma A founding member of C8 who is active outside the municipality Two delegates of C8 serving on municipal committees A C8 activist working for the municipality (Office of Public Participation) Case study 3: Pécs: developing a social program for the city Fanni Aradi | Member of AVM Pécs Ildikó Bokrétás | Member of Emberség Erejével Alapítvány (Pécs) Szilvia Bognár | Deputy Mayor of Pécs Case study 4: “From the street to housing” in Kőbánya: an unlikely collaboration Vera Kovács | Founder of ULE – Utcáról Lakásba Egyesület, Budapest Géza Mustó and Tibor Weeber | Deputy Mayors of Budapest’s 10th district Formal cooperation / civil society roundtable Tibor Csathó | Member of the Életfa Association and the local Civil Society Roundtable (Eger) Balázs Szücs | Deputy Mayor of Budapest’s 7th district Grassroots activist groups that are active at the local level Ágnes Szép-Magyar | Founder of Civil Kalász (Budakalász) Zoltán Juhász | Founder of Civil Kapocs (Alsónémedi) Andrea Homok | Former community organizer at Eleven Gyál (Gyál) Experts Gergely Lukácsházi | Budapest Dialóg István Sebestény | Statistician at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office Urbanist (asked to remain anonymous) Erika Barna | Director of the Ferencváros Community Foundation, Budapest

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 20 Case study 1 Budapest: promoting a participative turn in governance through urban interventions Interviewees Máté Lukács | Coordinator of Járókelő Ádám Kobrizsa | Founder of Mindspace Cili Lohász | Founder of VaLyó Gábor Kerpel-Fronius & András Szeles | Deputy Mayor of Budapest & the City Hall official responsible for relations with civil society BUDAPEST The city and its context In 1990, the Municipality of Budapest was divided into 22 districts (a 23rd was added in 1994), separating the city and its districts into equal entities within a two-tier system, although in a fragmented manner. For example, public transportation and infrastructure remained centralized powers in the hands of the Municipality of Budapest, while the distribution of resources became decentralized. The guidelines for collaboration were mostly informal during the 1990s, but in parallel with Hungary’s EU accession and the subsequent emphasis on partnership, Act 61/2008 (XI. 21.) of the General Assembly of Budapest formalized the contours of collaboration between civil society and local government in the city. After the municipal elections of November 2019, the left-liberal opposition gained power in Budapest and promised to change the course the city had followed under the previous mayor, who was supported by the Fidesz party, which controls the national government. During the mandate of the previous mayor, between 2010 and 2019, the deputy mayors did not have any political responsibilities. This changed in 2019, as the new mayor put the three deputy mayors also in charge of political decisions. In November 2019, as a gesture of good will, around 90 civil society organizations (CSOs) were invited to City Hall to open up discussions on collaborative practices and to show that the municipality is willing to put its relationship with them on a new footing. After the 2019 municipal elections, similar changes in power took place in many of Budapest’s districts, where the newly elected leaders proposed a more progressive policy environment, by employing “NGO-minded staff,” as Gábor Kerpel-Fronius, the deputy mayor responsible for smart city issues and civil engagement explains. A look at the past few years reveals that the decision makers had already been moving towards more participative mechanisms, irrespective of the election results, as some experts we interviewed noted cautiously. Even though participative mechanisms have become more popular in recent years, an urbanist we interviewed points to the ambiguous nature of such practices, which can be both a form of emancipation and a way of coopting civil society dynamics for political legitimation. However, the Municipality of Budapest and the new mayor have shown a much greater interest in CSOs and their ideas about the city, for example by actively participating in meetings and promoting inclusive governance mechanisms.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 21 Bottom-up initiatives with a focus on the quality of public spaces After the 2019 elections, CSOs that have been active for years finally had the chance to be in the spotlight. Interviewees from CSOs relate a common experience of City Hall finally initiating an open and trustful relationship with them. In one way or another, this has led to discussions and meetings about future possibilities of collaboration. Járókelő (Streetwalker) is a Fix My Street-like online platform that operates in 23 cities and in each of the 23 districts of Budapest. Citizens can submit complaints about problems in their neighborhood, accompanied by a photo and a short description, which is then published on Jarokelo.hu and sent via email to the responsible authority to highlight the problem. Járókelő, with the help of local activists, facilitates these procedures by sending the complaint directly to the competent local entity/organization (which is particularly relevant in the multi-level governance scheme of Budapest). The website has been operating in Budapest since October 2012. It added the first other city to its service in June 2014 and then released an Android mobile application. For its work in connecting citizens to municipalities and helping them solve local problems, Járókelő received the SozialMarie Award for Social Innovation in May 2014. The website has around 20,000 visitors per month and registers 30 to 50 complaints per day in Budapest alone. Járókelő tries to keep the relationship at a technical level, rather than directly appealing to the political level. It works with municipalities and local companies (those responsible for road maintenance, park maintenance, etc.) to improve road maintenance and solve public complaints more effectively. It thus encourages citizen participation at the local level and enhances the quality of communication with local governments. To avoid political conflicts and situations in which conflicts of interest might arise, Járókelő relies on transparency and fact-based communication, open data and open evaluations. When the platform was launched, the municipalities were unprepared for this type of engagement and how to deal with citizen complaints; they failed to fully understand the platform or how it could be beneficial for them. As many of the municipalities lack the capacity of innovation to make their services more efficient and user-friendly, Járókelő provides a platform that supports their work – it can create a mutually beneficial win-win scenario, by improving public spaces and building up trust between local governments and citizens. Some districts do not respond at all, while others answer by post, demanding that someone at Járókelő scan and then send the letter by email to the complainant and upload it on the platform. The lack of effective communication is also revealed by the fact that the local authorities frequently use patronizing and simplistic language in their replies to citizens. VaLyó (Város és folyó – City and River) is an organization that aims for a better use of the Danube river in Budapest, by bringing it closer to citizens through various projects. It was founded as an association in 2014, but its initial activities were more informal and included partaking in different projects aimed at utilizing the public spaces along the Danube. In recent decades, the Danube has only been included in large-scale urban planning strategies, whereas the idea behind VaLyó was to initiate small-scale projects, to make the river more accessible to citizens, often by temporarily reducing car traffic. The creation of VaLyó was also driven by the fact that existing green movements lacked a positive message and only expressed criticism towards current practices and policies. Instead, VaLyó’s mission focuses on activities that show what could be done in the city, “even if it is only a two-square meter space,” as Cili Lohász, the organization’s founder, explains. All its members are part-time volunteers who do not receive any income from the projects. This is a deliberate tactic in order to avoid constantly having to apply for funds to sustain the organization, which instead relies mostly on donations or organized fundraising events. As its founder notes, VaLyó tries to be different from “traditional” CSOs by relying mostly on contacts from local, more embedded members of civil society. It also has an ambivalent relationship with local governments, sometimes more collaborative and often confrontational, depending on the issue at stake. In general, the organization tries to approach local governments in a collaborative manner, but if the situation requires it, they will not shy away from criticism. Under the previous mayor of Budapest, the relationship was generally hostile, and VaLyó was “blacklisted” from receiving funds, as part of the political attack on the NGO sphere. Mindspace focuses on issues related to smart city visions, education, the organization of conferences and the “gamification” of urban interventions. Active in the Central Eastern European region, it develops and implements the soft elements of urban interventions instead of engaging in more rigid planning procedures. The organization’s goal is to create a more creative bureaucracy, for which it fosters participatory planning mechanisms. Its approach is based on process design, from web development and graphics through to professional facilitation, in order to promote more effective and transparent bureaucratic procedures. Since it was founded in 2011, Mindspace’s financial situation has changed significantly. In the beginning, its work was largely subsidized by EU funds, but it recently started to have a contract-based relationship with local governments, based on the provision of facilitation services. Currently, Mindspace has two work agreements with local governments, one with the Municipality of Budapest and another with the city’s 8th district. As part of these projects, it is responsible for the implementation of the participatory mechanisms of the Integrated Settlement Development plans, for developing an online platform for the participatory design of public urban spaces, and for convening a group of subject matter experts for facilitated workshops. Renewing the institutional framework for participation The Municipality of Budapest has initiated a series of meetings with CSOs to renew the 2008 act that defines the framework of civic consultation processes with various stakeholders. The idea is to better institutionalize these mechanisms, instead of engaging in ad hoc collaborations. Until formal rules have been defined, this ad hoc format promotes subjective decisions and collaborations, which go against the aims of the new leadership. Nevertheless, for the time being, some progressive and more experienced NGOs have taken the lead to deepen their relationship with City Hall.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 22 The Civil Society Relations Office already operated during the period from 2010 to 2019, but it only had two municipal employees, and CSOs were only included to legitimize decisions that the municipality had already taken. The tasks of the former Civil Society Relations Office were mixed and included matters that could not be dealt with by any other departments (such as the issue of minority self-governments). Now it already has a staff of five or six employees, with plans to expand it to 10 in total. The same office will also be responsible for the development of a participatory budget. At the moment, three areas for civic-local government cooperation are in the making, based on a new umbrella model with three main focus areas: social/care, participation and environmental issues, with a working group dedicated to each in order to address particularly problematic issues (social/care will probably will be the most comprehensive, including housing, disabilities, drug use, Roma minorities). The Municipality of Budapest intends to create an open registration procedure to avoid personal preferences for working with certain organizations, and to open up collaborative processes to a wider group of dedicated civil society actors. For each of these areas, plenaries as well as more frequent meetings are planned that will bring together CSO representatives, municipal officials and political decision makers. The green working group was the first to be established, based on the suggestions of green CSOs, already in December 2019. As the deputy mayor responsible for participation and the civic referent explains, a serious cultural transformation is needed: “in its normal, comfortable processes, the bureaucratic machine considers CSOs to be a nuisance,” which needs to change, he argues, emphasizing that local government employees need to learn how to do things differently. The deputy mayor relies on an active lobby of “single-issue” CSOs, as he explains, and it will be up to his decision which issues will gain more attention. By the end of the cycle, the municipality’s goal is to become a much more open institution, where CSOs “still look at politicians with a suspicious eye, but a normal discussion can happen.” The aim is to create an environment where disagreements are possible, in order to promote constructive and intensive dialog. For this happen, one of the main tasks is to create channels for facilitating communication. Careful steps ahead Half a year after the 2019 municipal elections, partly due to process of creating the new roles and partly because of the pandemic, fewer collaborations have been realized than initially planned. The original budget has been cut and broader participatory mechanisms have been cancelled or reduced. Nevertheless, the formation of the environmental working group is considered to be a positive outcome of the cultural change in the municipality, as is the approval, by the Budapest General Assembly, of a monitoring system aimed at preventing corruption and promoting transparency (known as the ”This is the Minimum!” program). The main goal is to formalize the relationship between civil society and local government, in order to reduce ad hoc collaborations. The municipality would like to see as many stakeholders as possible participate in the near future, not only a narrow circle of CSOs. The emphasis of the new leadership is clearly on the cultural change that it could bring to the municipality. However, since the central government is reducing the responsibilities and the independence of local governments, it is becoming more difficult for the Municipality of Budapest to implement the original plans. It already had to cut the planned budgets for collaborative practices and cancel some of the meetings with CSOs. “We will have to be in touch with many organizations to carry out measures that have a low budget but a high impact,” as the deputy mayor puts it. The ultimate goal is to show the country that CSOs can be treated as partners rather than enemies. Reducing car traffic has been one of the main promises of the new mayor, and to this end, the municipality collaborated with VaLyó to close the Danube embankment to cars on weekends during the summer. As Cili Lohász explains, VaLyó already has a decade of experience, and managed to find common ground with the municipality to formalize their relationship even in the face of the COVID-19 restrictions. The organization had to go back to its roots: working from a low budget, relying on its CSO network to manage projects and working in an uncertain environment. Meanwhile, Mindspace has experienced less of a setback in carrying out its projects, given that it largely relies on online platforms to reach out to citizens. Barriers to making a difference Although the pandemic slowed down the renewal of the institutional framework, under the new city leadership there is a general spirit of optimism among CSOs. However, the activists emphasize that “the old reflexes still work” and that they are currently waiting to see if things will go in the right direction. The CSOs note that in general, there is still a lack of transparency as to who is responsible for which projects within City Hall. The distribution of roles is not yet clear, due to the creation of new positions and responsibilities, and therefore the communication among municipal employees is not yet efficient, which needs to be improved in the future. Moreover, the major issue related to these collaborations is to forge a more coherent network from the initiatives that are being pushed forward. This could work well in general, but there is a misunderstanding on the part of the municipalities: they believe that they only need to communicate with residents, but they should also help small businesses and CSOs to become more independent and financially stable. The municipalities have to understand that CSOs cannot always work for free, which is currently the case on many occasions. The work they do has to be better acknowledged, and if CSOs are to be part of a new governance model, the financial foundation of their collaboration with the local authorities also needs to be improved.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 23 Case study 2 C8 – civil society actors in politics: role models faced with a role dilemma Interviewees Five members of C8, including a founding member, three C8 delegates to the municipal committees and one activist who works for the municipality. Inspired by the municipalist movement of Ada Colau, a civic activist from Barcelona who launched a political movement, the organization C8 – Civilek Józsefvárosért (Citizens for Józsefváros) conducted a successful election campaign in the 8th district of Budapest, with the result that András Pikó (C8), a former journalist, won the local elections. The success of this participatory grassroots campaign is illustrative of a wider phenomenon in Hungary, where civic activists have gotten involved in institutionalized politics, and (in some places by collaborating with oppositional political forces) managed to win mayoral races in the October 2019 municipal elections. Context In the 1990s, the 8th district appeared in the public discourse as a stigmatized “ghetto,” and in the case of the large proportion of Roma and immigrant residents, this stigma was ethnicized. Since the early 2000s, and especially after metro line 4 was opened in 2014, the district has become more and more attractive to young people for its cheaper rents, bringing about large-scale developments and gentrification, rising rents and demographic change. Between 2009 and 2019, right-wing Fidesz mayors governed the district with a “law and order” approach. They continued the “rehabilitation programs” of the previous liberal mayors (which included both participatory elements toward community renewal and heavy-handed police operations), controlled poverty through harsh, punitive measures and tried to dominate local civil society by creating new Map source: Wikipedia organizations and dominating the local media. This, however, gave rise to a vivid alternative cultural-political resistance centered around community centers and social initiatives. The team that rallied around C8 during the election campaign included prominent figures from the grassroots community, specifically from the housing movement. The local civil society landscape included several other initiatives, organized mainly in specific neighborhoods. Some of them are partly coopted by the local government, others are active in specific areas (cultural heritage, built environment, social and minority issues). For a long time, local politics has been characterized by a low level of public participation. For socio-political reasons, voter turnout is lower than in any other areas of Budapest, even with the slight increase from 35% to 40% in the 2019 elections. The path to victory is paved with failures Before the 2019 local elections, it became clear that no opposition party was keen to field its own candidate against the incumbent Fidesz mayor in the 8th district, which opened the door for candidates from civil society. This political vacuum is the outcome of previous electoral failures and the general weakness of opposition party organizations in Hungary. However, this window of opportunity was also the outcome of C8’s effort to appear as an equal partner, instead of allowing the decision on this “lost cause district” to be made in the closed-door meetings of party officials. C8 followed a political strategy that drew on the lessons learnt from the past years of civic struggle for political representation. From this political context, C8 emerged as a “non-specialist” civil society organization (CSO), which can be described as an umbrella organization that absorbs local activists and citizens from very different backgrounds who share a dissatisfaction with local politics. Although members of C8 have also carried out advocacy campaigns around particular local issues, it should more accurately be described as a movement that is inseparable from its specific political context. C8’s predecessor was the KÖZÖD Civic Association, an informal group recruited from the local elite (activists, intellectuals, former politicians) with around 10 members. From 2014, KÖZÖD was active mostly on social issues, the management of the municipal housing stock, representing the interests of local citizens, and watchdog activities against the lawlessness of local government. The local knowledge and expertise of its members helped KÖZÖD to successfully interfere in municipal decisions. In 2017, there was a by-election for one of the seats on the city council, where KÖZÖD and other activists ran an independent campaign for Márta Bolba, a socially minded Lutheran pastor from the district. The opposition parties did not support her, but stood behind another candidate, a local gangster rapper, which resulted in the right-wing Fidesz candidate winning the election. While the move of entering local politics had already sparked debates among the members of KÖZÖD, this grassroots campaign allowed them to gain experience in managing a professional campaign and changed their focus from being more of an expert organization to more direct engagement and embeddedness.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 24 In 2018, another by-election became necessary when the previous mayor, Fidesz strongman Máté Kocsis, was elected to parliament. This time, civic groups and political parties coordinated their efforts and endorsed Péter Győri, an independent candidate and founder of Menhely Alapítvány (Shelter Foundation), an organization that has supported homeless people in Budapest since 1990. Several subsequent C8 members deliberately abstained from participating in this campaign, which ended with a disappointing result. However, this district-level campaign and its shortcomings again enhanced the activists’ knowledge of professional campaigning. András Pikó worked as a PR adviser on this campaign, but still not as a high-profile actor. Through discussions about future strategy, this campaign laid the foundations for C8, although the association was only formally registered in September 2019. Those involved in this process realized that the opposition parties, while recognizing their contribution (in manpower), gave them no leadership role in the campaign and no say in choosing the candidate or in writing the program. The campaign staff was also led by the parties, which caused no direct conflict with the political actors but influenced C8’s future strategy. C8 decided to maintain an independent profile by minimizing its dependence on and subservience to bargains made among the political parties. To achieve this, it had to increase its embeddedness, which helped it to enhance its bargaining power and to play the role of initiator before the 2019 local elections. Faced with opposition parties that had been weakened by their electoral defeats and thus lacked the confidence that they could win, C8 managed to put forward its own mayoral candidate, policy program and campaign team. The activists even managed to get the support of the opposition parties for their candidate and electoral program, despite the fact that the opposition parties had divided the districts of the capital among them, meaning that one of the parties had to give way to Mr. Pikó instead of fielding its own candidate. The campaign mode energized the organization, drawing in external experts as well as common citizens, who now form the backbone of C8. Despite its grassroots character, the election campaign was characterized by professionalism: the work was done according to plan, using experts and data. The collaborative drafting of the election program was also a way to increase embeddedness and legitimize C8 as a political actor. Surveys, door-to-door communication with 600 residents, focus groups and public participation served as a real driver for identifying and prioritizing the main issues of the campaign. This produced interesting results: although C8 concentrated on “non party-political” issues such as street cleaning, respondents also mentioned the biased local media as an important problem. The electoral program is still an important point of reference for the C8 members: those serving as committee members are referring to it as an explicit mandate that provides direction for their operation. The campaign team, which was led by an activist closely associated with C8, also handled the campaign finances. It had little to spend on billboards or advertisements, although the opposition parties also contributed to the campaign. The activists conducted an intensive door-to-door campaign, in which they canvassed not only for Pikó, but also for the opposition candidates running for the city council. Between 150 and 200 activists were working on the campaign, many of whom represented “the cream” of local civil society, using innovative methods (e.g. street walking tours around the district), data analytics and creative community building. C8 also organized constant training for volunteers and activists, and unlike in a party campaign, made huge efforts to engage the volunteers, making them responsible for minor tasks and building up a sophisticated system for giving feedback. As such, C8 turned into a very professional campaign team that managed the strategic planning until election day. After October 2019, the electoral victory of Mr. Pikó and the opposition coalition that had assembled behind him created a dramatically new situation for C8. Inside and outside the municipality Interviewees working in municipal committees point out that party politicians often have a different mindset from civil society activists. As C8 is part of the ruling coalition, it has to be involved in the city-level coordination to keep things working, but it cannot vote. Collaboration on issues laid down in the policy program is difficult, since party politicians control the committees responsible for preparing the decisions. They are less motivated to work on strategic goals and long-term issues or to swiftly find solutions to problems raised by residents. They prefer visible, short-term results and avoid the political risks involved in tackling the most controversial issues of the municipal status quo. Acting as external members of these committees does not give C8 sufficient political weight, hence its position depends on the attitude and ability of the committee chairs, but also on the clout and respect accumulated by its members through their hard work and expert knowledge. To resolve this situation, C8 also participates in internal working groups, where strategy documents can be prepared more smoothly. C8 and the district mayor continue to organize forums to collect and discuss the residents’ concerns in every part of the district. While Pikó has distanced himself from C8, he is still a member. Moreover, several C8 members of the campaign team are now employees of the municipality, but as public servants, they have “removed their C8 badges,” as one of the activists noted. If it voices any criticism, C8 risks weakening the position of the mayor and causing a political scandal that would be sensationalized by the right-wing media, which would delegitimize both the mayor and C8. As one of the interviewees phrased it, C8 now faces the strategic dilemma of becoming either a watchdog or a puppy dog of the municipality. As a value-oriented civic group that wants to accomplish its program, C8 needs to energize the project development and policy preparation processes inside the City Hall, but it cannot give up its hard-won institutional position by simply walking out. The organization now has to come up with a strategy for how to resolve the crisis caused by this internal-external position. A long-term solution might be to aim for more influential positions within the municipality in order to recalibrate it into a more “civic” mode of operation. However, given the bipolar political situation, this endeavor would face resistance from the opposition parties. Despite the merits of the campaign run by C8, political representatives often call into question the legitimacy of the group’s presence in the decision-making process. Another, more

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 25 targeted strategy for C8 would be to return to advocacy about winnable – and therefore galvanizing – local issues, which is something the organization is already doing with regard to a disputed investment project. In this context, it collaborates with another CSOs to oppose the real estate development project by means of community-building practices in the neighborhood. Such initiatives, however, necessarily interfere with the operation of the local government. To promote greater democracy and participation, C8 has become involved in several initiatives fronted by the municipality, including a local consultation about movie shoots, organizing forums and by conducting a survey. Many C8 members have been involved in voluntary assistance also during the COVID-19 pandemic, but the local government often keeps silent about their role, since this would “politicize” these activities. Doing voluntary work for the local government channels energy away from the daily activities of the organization. Many vocal residents see C8 as a privileged CSO or a “local party” that is gaining a lot from governing the municipality, which is not the case. C8 does not accept subsidies from the municipality and does not even rent any premises from it, but this is hard to explain to the public. That being said, the participatory approach of C8 has been incorporated into the operation of the municipal government. A new department has been created, called the Office of Public Participation, in order to strengthen the involvement of the public in decision-making processes. The Office for Public Participation, backed by the mayor and legitimized by the participatory pledge contained in his electoral program, is formally a department of the municipality, with dedicated projects (participatory budgeting, forums, consultations, COVID-19 volunteering, etc.) But it follows a more comprehensive approach with a view to making the whole municipality more transparent, accessible and participatory. Through its involvement in preparing the decisions of the mayor’s administration, the office cooperates with other departments, assisting them in two-way communication and consultation (e.g. participatory decision making about the local awards and decorations, summaries about council meetings in language that is easy to understand). It currently has a staff of five, among them a former C8 member and the former campaign manager. The office is responsible for programs in which many C8 members are involved as volunteers. However, the office is not engaged in any close and formal cooperation with C8; since it represents the municipality, not C8. This means, that C8 is not mentioned, even if the C8 members sometimes feel that they are doing the lion’s share of the work. This is a strongly held view among the members of C8 – despite the fact that the Office for Public Participation also disposes of the assets and human resources of the municipality – which is largely invisible to CSOs outside the day-to-day work of the municipality. Two possible solutions to this strategic dilemma have been proposed within C8: one is to behave like one of the local CSOs, carrying out collaborative projects together with them and with the municipality under the logos of all the participating organizations. In this scenario, the creation of a formal forum (CSO roundtable) would facilitate the coordination between the civil society actors. The other solution is to leave these tasks to the municipality, which should involve other volunteers and participants in its projects, while C8 would concentrate on its own projects and engage with the municipal authorities more at arm’s length. In this second scenario, C8 would assume a privileged position in a political sense, setting it somewhat apart from other local CSOs. All our interviewees agreed that performing voluntary work for the municipality as if the campaign was still ongoing is not a sustainable option for C8, and that strategic decisions have to be made. C8 cannot afford to undercommunicate its work, since it is the lifeblood of its ability to compete politically. Some of its members want to deploy their work as an asset themselves, instead of allowing political actors to appropriate it. With no internal hierarchy or party discipline within C8, these tensions may lead to conflicts in the future. C8’s role dilemma is representative of a more systemic contradiction. In the overloaded Hungarian local government sphere, which has to counterbalance the government’s antidemocratic centralization efforts, grassroots movements such as C8 that become involved in politics are faced with an environment that is dominated by political parties. They need to work with these parties, but should not necessarily merge into them. For a CSO, to gain influence over the institutions and processes of local government is a long learning process, in which an electoral victory is probably a unique situation. CSOs are able to develop their roles and strategies in a more organic manner while in opposition, by concentrating on specific issues and constituencies. If they aim to act as political representatives at the local level, they cannot circumvent the electoral game altogether, which requires not only the strength of a social movement, but a mature strategy and political agenda. Once they enter politics, they are responsible not only to their autonomous membership, but also to voters, which requires them to mediate between various interests and needs, as well as to bear responsibility for the static system they are trying to improve. Civic initiatives are able to legitimately criticize the shortcomings of partisan local politics (instructions and obligation coming from above instead of being embedded locally), and a pattern has emerged by which this partisan logic is slowly being dissolved and domesticated by localist impulses. A Hungarian study of CSOs actively involved in the 2019 local elections, which was conducted simultaneously with ours, highlighted similar experiences. The future of C8’s municipalist project depends on how much institutional change it can achieve within the local government, and how much leverage it can create not only for itself, but also for other local stakeholders. Stronger collaboration between such movements is very important to enable them to learn from each other, especially regarding their experience of pre- and post-election negotiations, which may improve their starting position as well as the intra-municipal setting for achieving their goals.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 26 Case study 3 “From the street to housing” in Kőbánya: an unlikely collaboration Interviewees Géza Mustó | Deputy Mayor of Kőbánya (left-liberal, Democratic Coalition, 2019-) currently responsible for housing Tibor Weeber | Deputy Mayor of Kőbánya (right-wing, Fidesz, 2010-) previously responsible for housing Vera Kovács | Founder of Utcáról Lakásba Egyesület (“From the street to housing,” ULE) The social and political context Kőbánya (the 10th district of Budapest) is an outer district of the city, one of the largest by area, with many brownfield sites and a population of 78,000 inhabitants. There is a significant Roma (Gypsy) presence, generally evenly distributed over the entire district. Recently, a small but visible Chinese community has also emerged. The Kőbánya municipal council was dominated by the Socialist Party between 1990 and 2010, when the right-wing governing party Fidesz took control of the municipality. Since 2019, the opposition coalition has the same number of votes in the municipal council as Fidesz, which necessitates cooperation between the two camps. For this reason, the Fidesz mayor has appointed two deputy mayors, one from Fidesz and one Map source: Wikipedia from the opposition. Social housing-related tasks are delegated to local governments (in Budapest, this is a district-level function). The most important of these tasks are the regulation and management of local public housing, decisions on the provision of housing benefits, and debt management within the framework of the so-called “settlement benefit” (the national normative housing benefit – home maintenance support – was abolished in 2015). It is therefore an important battleground for the housing movement to push local governments toward a more equitable and progressive public policy. But the resources disbursed by local governments for improving affordability and reducing indebtedness have decreased drastically. Housing problems more likely to be experienced by individuals with the lowest socioeconomic status are thus not being addressed by means of adequate policy responses: for example, there is a lack of social housing and policy programs to avoid homelessness. Nevertheless, the provision of social housing and the allocation of housing benefits are the responsibility of local governments, which leads to a highly fragmented system in terms of the eligibility criteria and the quality/level of the actual services provided in different parts of the city. It also makes innovative NGO-municipal cooperation crucial, since without social programs, social housing programs end up in tension. For the collaboration presented in this case study, the civil society situation of Kőbánya is less relevant, since Utcáról Lakásba Egyesület (ULE) is not a local grassroots organization, although its activities involve the participation of residents. In terms of context, it is more important to understand the social tensions related to the housing crisis in Budapest, the problem of homelessness, ULE’s connection to the housing movement, and the specific problems that the district of Kőbánya faces in this regard. These social problems are indifferent to the borders of the city districts. So far, the Municipality of Budapest has been unable to solve the collective action problems originating from the fact that the districts have incentives not to invest in social protection and housing but to push the burden onto the shoulders of other districts. In the last few years, homelessness, social housing, but also the drug-related problems of specific neighborhoods have risen to the top of the political agenda. There was a strong public demand for local politicians to “restore public order,” which resonated with both left-wing and right-wing parties. During our interview with the two deputy mayors from different parties, they shared very similar ideas about housing policies. From time to time, the local government has attempted to demolish local government-owned residential buildings inhabited by poor families or to eliminate “irregularities” (dispossess notices, demolishing the shacks of homeless people). This went hand in hand with anti-homeless regulations and rhetoric at the city and national level. But this is only one side of the story. According to the deputy mayors, the municipality of Kőbánya has invested a lot of effort into improving the social infrastructure for the homeless (which is more developed than in other districts), creating housing opportunities and pursuing innovative approaches to housing, for example the Lélek House (a state-funded program), which helps 30 formerly homeless people to reintegrate into society through social work methods. ULE’s “housing first” program is also one of these examples.

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 27 The ongoing housing crisis in Budapest has contributed to a strong housing movement. Civil society organization (CSOs) that have been active in taking care of the homeless since the 1989 regime change laid the foundations of the socio-political infrastructure in this field. Local experiments with “housing first” projects (such as ULE) started only in the late 2000s. They involve direct action to provide homes for a small number of specific homeless individuals and can also be understood as a political statement to demonstrate that this can be done. This shift brings to the fore the problem of social participation, emphasizing citizen rights over charity / social needs and confronting the symbolic and social exclusion from housing that is considered to be normal. ULE grew out of the local fight of “A Város Mindenkié” (The City is for Everyone, AVM) against the demolition of self-built shacks in 2012. AVM, an NGO founded in 2009, advocates for housing rights and comprises activists from both homeless and middle-class (secure housing) backgrounds. AVM managed to stop the forced evictions and to convince the local authorities to provide vacant, dilapidated public housing units that the group then renovates (through donations and volunteer work) to house some of the shack dwellers. Later, activists involved in these activities formed the ULE association. Besides exporting this model to other localities, the association also implements additional innovative local projects to provide affordable housing to formerly homeless people. ULE is part of a loose network that grew out of the AVM housing movement, with a focus on different areas, such as Utcajogász (Street Lawyers, which provides legal aid) or Közélet Iskolája (the School of Public Life, which provides training for activists). It is thus important to see ULE (which shares the same values as other CSOs) not just as an individual organization that promotes a housing policy program, but also as an actor within the wider housing movement that has opted for a strategy of cooperation with local governments, instead of a strategy based on confrontation and advocacy against anti-homeless measures. From the Street to Housing Since 2012, ULE’s mission is to help the largest possible number of rough sleepers to move into affordable rental housing and to push for the provision of affordable housing to become the institutional, local or national policy for tackling homelessness. This mission is not directly related to municipal housing policies, but social housing is the most important tool for achieving it. Apart from overseeing the management of a municipal housing stock, ULE has also set up a rental agency, to integrate privately-owned vacant housing into the provision of affordable housing. It has also installed second-hand mobile homes on lots it has either purchased or for which it has been granted right of use. This enables supporters of such “private sector-oriented” programs to invest in a socially sensitive manner, with a return on investment over time. ULE differentiates itself from the large NGOs (such as the Maltese Charity Service or the Red Cross) maintaining homeless shelters – which do not offer real solutions to the root causes of homelessness – but also from charity organizations that contribute resources but lack a professional approach to social work. ULE organizes intensive social work for its program participants. As the goal is to help clients retain their housing in the long run, the organization also identifies employment opportunities, and in some cases even offers jobs to tenants, so that they can cover their bills on time. ULE’s program in Kőbánya is based on an innovative idea: to renovate vacant, run-down municipal apartments with the help of volunteers and the participation of the homeless families who are going to inhabit them. For rough sleepers living in self-built shacks, institutional care (mass homeless shelters) often means a step back, as people living in self-built dwellings who are managing their own household would not be able to keep most of their belongings if they moved to a shelter; nor would they be able to maintain their household composition, as couples cannot move into the same room and potentially not even into the same institution. Members of the target group have no chance of ever obtaining long-term, sustainable individual housing because most of the relevant municipal decrees stipulate that homeless persons are ineligible for municipal rental housing or the state-funded Lélek program if they cannot demonstrate that they were residents of the district for the five years before they lost their housing. The local governments own low-quality housing stock with many uninhabitable apartments, which they have trouble utilizing, while ULE’s program provides voluntary resources for renovating and leasing out these apartments to needy people. The group that became ULE formed during the protests against the evictions from the Terebess forest. With the active participation of stakeholders and the public, the illegal demolition plans were stopped. In the meantime, members of the group and stakeholders (homeless people in need of housing) approached all local government actors – notaries, mayors and senior municipal department staff – by letter and telephone, until negotiations could be initiated to resolve the crisis. During this process, stakeholders and district decision makers entered into talks. In the summer of 2012, the district’s deputy mayor for social affairs promised that – despite the final decision to evacuate the area – no shack would be demolished until its inhabitants managed to find a suitable place to move. AVM held residential rallies in the forest to inform the people living there about their rights and the possibilities for moving out. In the end, with the help of local social workers, most of the shack dwellers received acceptable accommodation outside the forest, but the inhabitants of five of the shacks were still unable to move out. Residents of four of the five shacks wanted to get a rental apartment, and in the spring of 2013, four people (two couples) from two households were finally able to move into municipal rental housing. The consultation with the municipality took a very long time, involving both lawyers and other professionals, but the municipality also had to go through a lot of issues despite eventually being receptive to the idea. The homeless residents, who later became members of ULE, finally agreed with the municipality: the two couples would be able to move into the social rental housing that they would renovate (the activists accompanied the future tenants to the negotiations with the municipality). The detailed terms of the move were set out in a written agreement with the municipality. For the municipality, the most important condition for the move was that the people concerned had an officially verifiable income. As participants in the program, the municipality would have preferred couples and households with more than one person, but this did not materialize in the end. Unlike other programs, local residence (on paper) is not one of the criteria for eligibility. A homeless

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Hungary I Poland I Romania 28 member of AVM taught the basics of masonry to the middle-class volunteers who were helping with the renovation. This period also saw the formal establishment of ULE, which later became a partner of the municipality and today continues the program by adding two extra apartments every year. ULE – at the beginning working together with other larger NGOs, such as Habitat – brought together the most important players that had already been involved in the process and transformed itself into a legal service provider, which is not the case with AVM. Collaboration with the local government: lessons to be learned While the relationship between Kőbánya and the AVM advocacy group is unique and delicate, ULE has managed to achieve a stable collaboration thanks to the results of the program, the openness of both sides to negotiation, and good working relationship of the people involved. However, this does not automatically translate into good cooperation in other cases in which AVM and the district authorities of Kőbánya are involved – and in general, AVM has had a bad reputation among municipalities (those governed by the right in particular) as a radical advocacy group. According to the two deputy mayors, the municipality acts based on information about the financial situation of tenants that is classified and cannot be revealed to a third party, while protesters often lack knowledge of such factors. This conflict also affected the establishment of the cooperation with ULE, but by now, both sides are working together based on mutual trust and pragmatism about the program. In this case, there is no information asymmetry between the two parties, since ULE represents the tenants. While the policy agendas they pursue are very different, both sides agree that the present system of social service provision and the relevant legislation are inadequate. From a political perspective, the collaboration with ULE contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the housing situation instead of building up a false image of the municipality as an omnipotent actor that should be shamed for incompetence and inaction. ULE strictly limits its advocacy work to its direct field of operation (though it did participate in the protests against the demolition of the social housing bloc mentioned earlier). However, the partnership roles can be separated from such activities. The two deputy mayors mention that they would like to see more NGO-municipal cooperation to lobby for reform of the relevant national legislation. ULE also entered into collaboration with several other districts of Budapest, but these projects are not of a comparable size to the one in Kőbánya (where 17 of ULE’s 22 apartments are located). After the “symbolic” gesture of initiating the cooperation, and the renovation of the first apartments, these collaborations failed to advance. The collaboration with non-political municipal institutions (the trusts responsible for social housing) was difficult, but the real reason for the stagnation never became clear. In the case of Zugló (the 14th district), the planned project caused political turmoil because ULE’s political ally was not able to convince the majority of the district council members to support the project. In the other districts, the collaboration was not underpinned by the kind of bottom-up social participation that took place in Kőbánya – these projects either started as individual interventions or upon the invitation of politicians. ULE’s housing agency can be seen as a response to these difficulties. Building cooperation with the local government required a lot of energy because of the long time it took the organization to get the decision makers to understand the project and to break down their initial resistance, which originated from political prejudice and a lack of information. CSOs also need to understand the political logic and the power fields in which they operate. Political agreements are often invisible to civil society initiatives, and according to the interviewee form ULE, their only option is to be very determined and move forward. Long-term cooperation, however, cannot be based solely on pressure – both sides have to reach a common understanding. The positive aspect of the right-wing authorities in Kőbánya was their clear and open approach toward making decisions in this are

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